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the exchange. Second, the market efficiency improved in accordance with reduction in
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obtained the discretionary power to operate the policy regarding commodity market, the
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1 Introduction
Economists have investigated how and to what extent each county’s government inter-
vened in the commodity market and industry. In particular, there is much literature on
optimal monetary policies in a context of “discretion versus rules” for the last four decades.
(See, for example, Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), Taylor (1993),
McCallum (1993) and Clarida et al. (1999)) The literature has demonstrated that pol-
icy rules are superior to discretion when the time inconsistency lesson by Kydland and
Prescott is valid and when market participants believe the commitment to rules. As for
their difference, in general, discretion is regarded as period-by-period optimization by
the authority; a rule calls for period-by-period implementation of a contingent treatment
that is selected from a generally applicable list for many decision periods. Following
Taylor (1993), we understand that rule-like behavior implies systematic in the sense of
“methodical, according to a plan, and not casual or at random”. At the same time, we
follow McCallum’s (1993) idea that the authority “must also design the systematic re-
sponse pattern [so as] to take account of the private sector’s expectational behavior” at
one time. Accordingly, this paper investigates the relationship between market efficiency
of the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange and the Japanese government intervention in rice
distributions by directly buying and selling rice from 1914 to 1939.
Being interested in a series of interventions into the rice exchanges in the prewar Tokyo
and Osaka, we have already studied the relation between market efficiency and interven-
tions in the rice markets using monthly data (see Ito et al. (2016, 2017a)). We paid our
attention to the timing of interventions in the rice exchanges more than the nature of
interventions. Nevertheless, considering the fact that the government’s actions to the
rice markets were different in nature at each period, we investigate the differences in this
paper using daily data, only available for the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange, with more
attentions. More specifically, we examine whether the rice prices in the exchange reflected
them and its market efficiency would reduce or not when the government interventions in
the exchange were systematic rule-like behavior and easy to be expected. However, the
rice market in the prewar Japan is an unusual subject to study the government policies
in the context of “discretion versus rules” since it was irrelevant to monetary policies.
In particular, during the period that we address in this paper, the Japanese government
struggled to find better policies for stable rice distributions and for controlling rice price; it
attempted some actions: prohibiting traders with highly speculative transaction, directly
buying and selling rice in the spot market, intervening in the rice exchange and estab-
lishing laws to facilitate the above actions. The changing policies of the prewar Japanese
government provide us with lessons on which type of policy, discretionary or rule-like, in
a commodity market had advantages for the objective. These policies had relation with
a shift in the structure of world economy in interwar period.
Many governments of the countries that have their own colonies had strengthened their
interventions from the First World War. During the WWI, the European countries raised
their tariffs, and introduced the quantitative restrictions on trade and the system of import
licenses. Despite the agreement that the international community removed the restriction
in the Genoa Conference of 1922, any countries did not abolish their import prohibitions
after the war (see Kindleberger (1989); Findlay and O’Rourke (2007, pp.443–446)).In
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addition, they restricted foreign trade to protect the domestic industry from the Great
Depression of 1929. For example, the US government enacted the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act to perform the tariff protection in 1930 (see Eichengreen and Temin (2003)). The
protection policies divided the world economy into blocks, and major countries depended
on their colonial trading for supply of foods and raw materials during interwar period.
These economic structure and policy in Japan were no exception in the same period.
Japan won the First Japanese-Sino War from 1894 to 1895, and Taiwan became the
first Japanese colony. From the war, Japan expanded its territory by colonizing parts of
the East Asia and Southeast Asia, and it became a unique Asian country which possessed
colony. These colonies such as Taiwan and Korea supplied the food crops and industrial
resources to the home islands from the turn of the twentieth century (see Francks (2015,
pp.82–85)). In particular, during interwar period, Japan enhanced a dependency on
its colonial trading to a greater extent than European countries and formed its block
economy in East Asia since the geographical distance between the metropole and the
colony in Japan was closer than that of European countries (see Okubo (2007) and Hori
(2009)). In this block economy, rice was the main item which imported from the Japanese
colonies to the home islands.
In Japan, rice had been a staple food since ancient times and had been a listed good
in the commodity exchange since the early modern period; the Tokugawa Shogunate
certified the Dojima Kome Kaisho (the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange) in 1730. From the
same year to the 1930s before the Second World War in Japan, rice was a representative
listed good in the futures market. In fact, there were 37 exchanges in 1930, and rice
was traded in 25 exchanges including 19 exchanges which specialized in rice trading (see
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1931, pp.4–5)). Accordingly, the rice policy had
great significance for not only food supply policy but also commodity market policy.
Especially, rice occupied an important position of price stabilization policy. Before the
WWII, price fluctuation of rice strongly affected the change in general prices. Actually, 13
percent of the weight of the Tokyo Wholesale Price Index in the 1933 Base was the price
of rice (see Bank of Japan, Research and Statistics Department (1987, p.40)). Therefore,
the Japanese government had implemented the rice policy and strengthened its rice policy
after the WWI. During the WWI, Japan experienced industrialization and urbanization
and sent its troops to Siberia. Under this situation, traders anticipated a rise in rice
prices and cornered in the rice market. As a result, rice prices increased rapidly, and
Kome Sodo (the rice riots) occurred nationwide in 1918. Reflecting on the disruption
from the riot, the government strengthened its rice policy to adjust the balance of rice
supply and demand. There were two characteristic points in the policy during interwar
period in Japan.
First, the government compensated the rice shortage in the home islands of Japan
with the imports of colonial rice. In 1920, the Governor-General of Korea implemented
Sanmai Zoshoku Keikaku (the Plan to Increase in Rice Yield in Korea) to resolve the
shortage (see Yi (2015, pp.104–114); Governor-General of Korea (1922, p.5)). Second,
the Japanese government directly bought and sold rice in the spot market according
to the Rice Law in 1921 and the Rice Control Law in 1933. We have much literature
for this point. Based on Ohuchi (1950) and Suzuki (1974) which clarify the decision-
making process of the rice policy, Kawahigashi (1990) asserts that the rice policy reconciled
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conflicting interests between landowners and industrial factory owners. Tama (2013)
examines that the government purchase of rice encouraged fiercer competition between
brands of rice from the 1920s. Omameuda (1993) examines that the strengthening of
rice policy caused to split the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce into the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1925. On
the other hand, some literature focuses on the relationship between the rice policy and
rice market exists. Mochida (1970) mentions that the rice policy which suppressed the
price volatility of rice triggered declines in the rice futures market. At the same time,
establishing the two laws above resulted in the implementation of government’s policy
clearer for rice traders than before. In particular, the Rice Control Law called for period-
by-period implementation of a contingency formula regarding the rice market. However,
the government intervention in market generally causes reduction of the market efficiency
as much literature insists.
Considering the government’s action to be added into an information set of market
participants, one can apply a test of semi-strong efficiency in the line of Fama (1970).
Since Hansen and Hodrick (1980) formalized a method for testing both weak and semi-
strong forms of efficiency in foreign exchange markets, some studies in the context of
a semi-strong form of efficiency have examined whether the rate of return is affected
by some factors other than the lagged rates. For example, Frenkel (1980) examines the
foreign exchange market efficiency under floating systems. By regressing the forecast error
to other markets’ forecast errors. Goss (1987) studies whether Australian wool futures
prices reflect available information including government actions. Chance (1985) studies
how the inflation announcement would affect the treasury bond futures market efficiency
by using an event study and a dummy variable regression.
However, some literature indicates that the rice futures market was efficient during
interwar period when the Japanese government often intervened. Shizume (2011) asserts
that the rice futures market in Tokyo succeeded in providing a fine index of the expected
price of physical rice from the late 1920s to the late 1930s. Using a generalized least
squares (GLS) based time-varying VAR model, Ito et al. (2016, 2017a) investigates the
time-varying market efficiency of the rice market from 1881 to 1932 and examines that the
efficiency of the rice market improved in the 1920s. Conversely, Ito et al. (2016, 2017a)
does not discuss the relationship between a change in the rice policy and the time-varying
market efficiency of rice sufficiently since it mainly focuses on how an increase in rice
imports from the Japanese colonies affected the price formation of rice in the home islands
of Japan. Consequently, any literature does not investigate the time-varying efficiency of
the rice market in the 1930s when the government highly strengthened its rice policy.
This paper studies how and to what extent the government interventions in the rice
market affected the market efficiency of the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange over time peri-
ods, from 1914 to 1939. The Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange was the largest of the exchanges
which specialized in rice trading in Japan. In fact, its annual commission revenue from rice
transactions was 900,766 yen while that of the second-largest rice exchange, the Nagoya
Rice Exchange, was 165,366 yen in 1930 (see Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1931,
pp.4–5, 9–10)). Therefore, focusing on the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange, we precisely
examine that the interrelation between the governmentâĂŹs directly buying and selling
rice and a change in the efficiency of the rice market.
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This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief historical review on
rice policy the WWI in Japan. Section 3 presents our method to study market efficiency
varying over time based on, Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017b) model. Section 4 describes our daily
dataset, covering the futures prices in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange, and presents
preliminary unit root test results. Section 5 shows our empirical results using the time-
varying VAR models and discuss the relation between the changing government’s rice
policy and time-varying market efficiency. Section 6 concludes.
2 Historical Review on Rice Policy in Interwar Japan
Since the 1890s, Japan had suffered from a shortage of rice because of rapidly increas-
ing in rice demand. Especially, the Japan’s shortage became more serious after the
Russo-Japanese War from 1904 to 1905 along with its urbanization and industrializa-
tion (see Omameuda (1993, pp.60–63, 80–83)). Accordingly, the Japanese government
implemented two countermeasures to suppress increasing in rice prices due to the short-
age. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce forced the exchanges to accept
imported rice as a deliverable in 1912. This order increased the supply of deliverable rice
in the exchanges to decline futures prices (see Ito et al. (2016)). Second, the Governor-
General of Korea promoted japonica rice cropping in Korea. Imported rice including
Korean rice had been indica variety while Japan’s domestic rice was japonica variety; the
former had differences in texture and taste from the latter. As a result, rice consumers
in the home islands of Japan regarded Korean rice as an alternative grain. Under this
situation, the second policy shrank the above quality differences between domestic and
Korean rice (see Tohata and Okawa (1939, pp.322–326)). Nevertheless, the rice prices of
all grades in Japan shot up in the late 1910s.
During the WWI, the Japanese government sent its troops to Siberia in 1918. This
military action caused the speculative holding-off by rice traders who anticipated a rise
in rice prices. The rice prices actually shot up, and the nationwide riots, kome-sodo
(the rice riots), occurred in the same year. Accordingly, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce attempted to improve the policy regarding controls of both the price and the
balance between supply and demand of rice. In 1920, the government consulted the Rinji
Zaisei Keizai Chosakai (Extraordinary Economic and Finance Council) on the policy.
In the next year, the Council recommended it to introduce a new system to adjust the
balance of rice supply-and-demand, and the government enforced the Beikoku Ho (Rice
Law) in April 1921 (see Kawahigashi (1990, pp.100–145)).
The Rice Law enabled the government to implement two instruments to control the
balance between supply and demand of rice. Concretely, the government was allowed
to trade rice in the spot market and alter import duty on foreign rice. However, the
government could not buy and sell rice in order to stabilize rice price fluctuations since
the Rice Law did not allow the government to intervene in the spot market to control rice
prices directly. According to the Rice Law, when the government intended to intervene in
the market, it had to estimate the supply and demand of rice in advance. Nevertheless,
the law did not clearly state the criteria of government intervention. Then, while the
government could hardly recognize how much it should buy or sell rice, rice traders could
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not expect when and to what extent it would intervene. As a result, the government could
not conduct price-keeping operations with rice when Japan experienced rich harvest of
rice. Accordingly, it amended the Rice Law to control the rice prices in March 1925 (see
Omameuda (1993, pp.198–202)).
The amended Rice Law enabled the government to intervene in the spot market to
control the rice prices. Figure 1 exhibits the futures prices of second nearest and differed
contract transactions from 1914 to 1939.
(Figure 1 around here)
Figure 1 indicates that the prices fell down from the middle to the late in the 1920s.
In the same period, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry frequently bought the rice
in the spot market to keep the prices . In short, the government intervened in the rice
spot market in response to the price fluctuations of rice. Thus, the amendment of the
Rice Law made it easier for the rice traders to forecast the intervention. However, it
failed to keep the rice prices because it could not prevent the Korean rice imports from
increasing. According to the amended Rice Law, the colonial rice including Korean rice
was exempt from the control of import duty. Under the circumstances, whenever the
government bought the rice in the spot market to keep the prices, rice traders in Korea,
who anticipated an increase in rice prices by the government intervention, sent Korean
rice to the home islands of Japan. As a result, the imports of Korean rice increased when
the government conducted price-keeping operations, and the government failed to keep
the prices (see Hishimoto (1938, pp.728–729)). Accordingly, the Japanese government
abolished the amended Rice Law and enforced the Beikoku Tosei Ho (Rice Control Law)
in October 1933.
The government established the Rice Control Law to suppress the seasonal fluctuation
of rice distribution. Concretely, the law required the government to set a price range by
deciding maximum and minimum prices of rice in each year. If the physical rice prices
deviated from the range, the government had to intervene in the spot market to adjust
the prices (see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Rice Bureau (1933, pp.4–5)). To put
it differently, this law clearly stated the criteria of government intervention. The criteria
under the amended Rice Law, which was stated clearer than that under the original Rice
Law, did not denote the price range. Thus, the government was hardly able to declare
when it began to buy or sell the physical rice in response to the price fluctuations of rice
until September 1933. In contrast, even the traders easily expected when the government
would intervene in the rice spot market after the establishment of the Rice Control Law.
In the same period, the government attempted to strengthen its power to control the rice
prices. Accordingly, it enforced the Beikoku Jichi Kanri Ho (Rice Self-Management Law)
in September 1936 and administered the Rice Control Law and the Rice Self-Management
Law from then on (see Tsunoda (1937, pp.3–17)). Concretely, the Rice Self-Management
Law required farmers and land owners to organize 25 Beikoku Tosei Kumiais (Associations
for Management of Rice Distributions) in all corners of the home islands of Japan, Taiwan,
and Korea, and these associations stored the rice whose quantity was decided by the
government according to the Rice Self-Management Law. When the rice prices deviated
from the price range which was the government set according to the Rice Control Law,
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry could ordered the associations not to sell the
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stored rice. However, the government had never prevented the associations from selling
the rice (see Ota (1938, pp.845–849)). Consequently, the Rice Self-Management Law did
not affect the rice price formation.
From the same period, the Japanese government strengthened its wartime regime
and economic control after it opened the war against China in July 1937. The rice
trading was influenced by the circumstances. In April 1939, the Beikoku Haikyu Tosei
Ho (Rice Distribution Control Law) was enforced. The sixth article of the law stated
the government prohibited from the rice trading in futures. Accordingly, the government
launched into preparations toward the abolishment of rice futures trading. In July of
the same year, the government established the exclusive agent, Nihon Beikoku Co., Ltd.,
which would manage the rice market under the Rice Distribution Control Law. In the next
month, the rice exchanges including the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange suspended their
operations. Finally, Nihon Beikoku launched its operation and the rice traders could buy
and sell only in the spot market which Nihon Beikoku managed from October 1939 (see
Itagaki (1939, pp.82–121)).
3 The Model
This section provides a brief review of our method, which owes much of Ito et al. (2014,
2017b). Following their idea, we esimate an vector autoregressive (VAR) model with time-
varying coefficients. Then, we study time-varying nature of market efficiency of Osaka-
Dojima Rice Exchange using its daily data in relation to a series of rice law amendments.
Suppose that pt is a price vector of rice futures with two different contract months at
t period. Our main focus is reduced to the condition
E [xt | It−1] = 0, (1)
where xt denotes a return vector of futures at t period, that is, i-th componet of xt is
ln pi,t − ln pi,t−1 for i = 1, 2, 3. In other words, all expected returns at t period given the
information set available at t− 1 period are zero.
When xt is stationary, the Wold decomposition allows us to regard the time-series
process of xt as
xt = µ+ Φ0ut + Φ1ut−1 + Φ2ut−2 + · · · ,
where µ is the mean of xt and {ut} follows an i.i.d. multivariate process with the mean of
zero vector, and a covariance matrix of σ2I,
∑∞
i=0 ||Φ′iΦi|| <∞ with Φ0 = I. Note that the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) holds if and only if Φi = 0 for all i > 0. This suggests
that how the market deviates from the efficient market reflects the impulse response, a
series of {ut}’s. In this paper, we shall construct an index based on the impulse response
in order to investigate whether the EMH holds for the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange.
The easiest way to obtain the impulse response is using an VAR model and alge-
braically computation of its coefficient estimates. Under some conditions, the vector
return process {xt} of rice futures is invertible. We consider the following time-varying
VAR(q) model
xt = ν + A1xt−1 + A2xt−2 + · · ·+ Aqxt−q + εt, (2)
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where ν is an intercept term and εt is an multivariate error term with E [εt] = 0, E [ε2t ] =
σ2εI, and E [εtεt−m] = 0 for all m 6= 0. We can use the idea of of Ito et al. (2014, 2017b)
when we measure market efficiency that would vary over time. Directly applying the
Equation (7) to our model, we obtain our degree computed through the VAR estimated
coefficients, A1, · · · , Aq, as follows. First, we compute a cumulative sum of the coeffient
matrices of the impulse response,
Φ(1) = (I − A1 − A2 − · · · − Aq)−1 , (3)
Second, we define our degree of market efficiency,
ζ =
√
max [(Φ(1)− I)′(Φ(1)− I)], (4)
to measure the deviation from efficient market. Note that in the case of efficient market
where A1 = A2 = · · · = Aq = 0, our degree ζ becomes zero; otherwise, ζ deviates from
zero. That is why we call ζ the degree of market efficiency. When we find a large deviation
of ζ from 0 (both positive and negative), we can regard some deviation from one as an
evidence of market inefficiency. Furthremore, we can construct this degree that would
vary over time when we obtain time vrying estimates of the coefficients in Equation (2).
Adopting a method developed by Ito et al. (2014, 2017b), we estimate VAR coefficients
at each period in order to obtain the degree defined in Equation (4) at each period. In
practice, following their idea, we use a model in which all the VAR coefficients, except
for the one that corresponds to the intercept term, ν, follow independent random walk
processes. That is, we suppose
Al,t = Al,t−1 + Vl,t, (l = 1, 2, · · · , q), (5)
where an error term matrix {Vl,t} (l = 1, 2, · · · , q and t = 1, 2, · · · , T ) satisfies E [Vl,t] = O
for all t, E [vec(Vl,t)′vec(Vl,t)] = σ2vI and E [vec(Vl,t)′vec(Vl,t−m)] = O for all l and m 6= 0.
Ito et al.’s (2014; 2017b) method allows us to estimate the time-varying VAR (TV-VAR)
model:
xt = ν + A1,txt−1 + A2,txt−2 + · · ·+ Aq,txt−q + εt, (6)
together with Equation (5).
In order to conduct statistical inference on our time-varying degree of market efficiency,
we apply a residual bootstrap technique to the TV-VAR model above. In practice, we
build a set of bootstrap samples of the TV-VAR estimates under the hypothesis that all
the TV-VAR coefficients are zero. This procedure provides us with a (simulated) distri-
bution of the estimated TV-VAR coefficients assuming the rice futures return processes
are generated under the efficient market hypothesis. The, we can compute the corre-
sponding distributions of the impulse response and degree of market efficiency. Finally,
by using confidence bands derived from such simulated distributions, we conduct statisti-
cal inference on our estimates and detect periods when the Osaka-Dojima rice exchange
experienced market inefficiency.
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4 Data
In this paper, we conduct a dataset of daily rice futures prices in the Osaka-Dojima Rice
Exchange from September 1, 1914 through August 25, 1939. For the rice futures data
in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange, we utilize weighted average daily values for two
contract months is available: a second nearest contract (two months), and a deferred
contract (three months).1 The dataset consists of a primary source in Monthly Reports
on Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange.2 Our dataset ignores sunday, different national holidays
and regular exchange closings. For missing values due to irregular holidays by imperial
events and temporary exchange closings because of natural catastrophe or casualty, we
fill in with values obtained by spline interpolation. And we take the first difference of the
natural log of rice futures prices to compute the ex-post returns.
For our estimations, all variables that appear in the moment conditions should be
stationary. To confirm whether the variables satisfy the stationarity condition, we apply
the Elliott et al.’s (1996) augmented Dickey-Fuller generalized least squares (ADF-GLS)
test. We employ the modified Bayesian information criterion (MBIC) instead of the
modified Akaike information criterion (MAIC) to select the optimal lag length. This is
because, from the estimated coefficient of the detrended series, ψˆ, we do not find the
possibility of size-distortions (see Elliott et al. (1996); Ng and Perron (2001)). Table 1
shows the results of the unit root test with descriptive statistics for the data. The ADF-
GLS test suggests that all variables do not contain a unit root at the 1% significance
level.
(Table 1 around here)
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Preliminary Results
We first assume a time-invariant VAR(q) model with constant and employ Schwarz’s
(1978) Bayesian information criteria (SBIC) to select the optimal lag order in our pre-
liminary estimations. Table 2 summarizes our preliminary results for a time-invariant
VAR(q) model using the whole sample.
(Table 2 around here)
Table 2 also shows that the cumulative sum of the VAR estimates for the case of
differed contract month is smaller than the second nearest case. It shows that the differed
contract month market is the most efficient. This preliminary result coincides with Ito
et al.’s (2017a) time-invariant estimation, which concludes that the deferred contract
month market is the most efficient.
1We except a series of nearby contract (one month) to conduct our dataset. Because there exists
many missing values in a nearby contract.
2We find the primary source of daily futures prices in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange at Kansai
University Library (http://opac.lib.kansai-u.ac.jp/) which is located in Osaka, Japan.
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We investigate whether the parameters are constant in the above VAR(q) models
using Hansen’s (1992) parameter constancy test under the random parameters hypothesis.
Table 2 also presents the test statistics; we reject the null of constant parameters against
the parameter variation as a random walk at the 1% significance level. Therefore, we
estimate the time-varying parameters of the above VAR models to investigate whether
gradual changes occur in interwar Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange. These results suggest
that the time-invariant VAR(q) model does not apply to our data and that the TV-VAR(q)
model is a better fit.
From historical view point, the Japanese government strengthened its rice related
policy during the interwar period as we mentioned in Section 2. The policy potentially
affected the price formation of rice since it enabled the government to intervene in the
rice market. Accordingly, we estimate the degree of time-varying market efficiency using
the TV-VAR model in the next subsection.
5.2 Time-Varying Market Efficiency and Historical Interpretation
(Figure 2 around here)
Figure 2 shows that the degree of time-varying market efficiency gradually improved
over time. Until the early 1920s, rice transaction was conducted in the almost inefficient
market until the 1910s. However, the market efficiency improved from the middle 1920s.
Specifically, the transaction was conducted in efficient market in the following periods:
from December 1925 to May 1928, from December 1929 to September 1930, from October
1930 to October 1931, from May to November in 1932, from February to June in 1933, and
after November 1933. In brief, the market became nearly efficient after the amendment
of the Rice Law in 1925. Finally, it was efficient after the establishment of the Rice
Control Law in 1933. In fact, according to the standard deviations for the four periods:
0.170, 0.099, 0.060 and 0.049, we find that the time-varying degree became less and less
volatile over time. Accordingly, we discuss why the efficiency improved in accordance
with the amendment of the Rice Law and the establishment of the Rice Control Law
paying attention to discretion versus rules in the interwar Japanese rice policy. These
laws were aimed at adjusting the rice demand-and-supply balance and controlling rice
price as mentioned in Section 2. Then, we investigate trends in the rice futures prices and
the rice supply in interwar Japan.
According to Figure 1, the futures prices fluctuated wildly even under the Rice Law
and the Rice Control Law. This fluctuation depended largely on the change in the rice
supply.
(Figure 3 around here)
Figure 3 presents Japan’s annual supply volume of rice per capita from 1914 to 1939.
The statistics, which were calculated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, con-
sisted of initial stock, production, and foreign trade including colonial trade. The figure
indicates that the trend of rice supply also fluctuated greatly, and we find that this fluctu-
ation had relation with the variation in the degree of time-varying market efficiency under
the amended Rice Law. According to Figures 1 and 3, from 1925 to 1933, whenever the
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ratio of the supply volume to its five years moving average volume attained above or under
three percent, the efficiency tended to reduce. However, before and after this period, the
efficiency was irrelevant to the rice supply. Before the amendment of the Rice Law, the
transaction was conducted in the almost inefficient market even when the supply volume
did not deviate from its five years moving average volume. On the other hand, after the
establishment of the Rice Control Law, the futures market was always efficient even when
the supply volume varied wildly.
In summary, the trend of the efficiency changed when the government altered the
rice policy. Under this policy, the Japanese government attempted to adjust the rice
demand-and-supply balance and control the rice price by frequently intervening in the
rice market. Accordingly, we argue the relationships between the inefficient of rice market
and the government intervention from the next subsection.
5.2.1 Confusion of the Rice Exchange System in the 1910s
In the 1910s, the futures transaction was conducted in the almost inefficient market.
During the same period, the Japanese government forced the rice exchanges to accept
the delivery of the imported rice. As Ito et al. (2016) mention in detail, the government
interventions involving the delivery of imported rice often reduced the efficiency of the
rice futures markets.
In prewar Japan, the sellers in the rice exchanges frequently delivered physical rice to
clear their futures transactions. When they delivered physical rice, the exchanges basically
permitted them to use only domestic rice. In contrast, the delivery rule was changed when
the rice supply became insufficient since the industrialization and urbanization progressed
in the 1910s. In the same period, the rice price increased rapidly as shown in Figure 1, and
the government experimented with suppressing the rice price to change the delivery rule
which permitted the sellers to deliver the imported rice such as Taiwanese and Korean rice
in the exchanges. Consequently, buyers in the exchanges significantly faced uncertainty
about the rice delivery since they were liable to obtain the imported rice whose quality was
different from the domestic rice. This situation caused a disruption in the rice exchanges,
and the futures price failed to be a fine index of the expected price of rice in the spot
market as Ito et al. (2016) assert. In fact, Figure 2 shows that the transaction was
conducted in the almost inefficient market until 1919. Specifically, the market efficiency
reduced rapidly from the late 1917 to the early 1919. This circumstance resulted from
the following three factors.
First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce enforced the Bori Torishimari Rei
(the Ministerial Ordinance on Anti Excessive Profit) to suppress the rice price on Septem-
ber 1 1917. Under this ministerial ordinance, if a trader cornered or held off selling the
commodity to obtain excessive profits, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce could
prohibit him from trading of the commodity. In fact, the government punished 18 rice
traders including nine traders in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange for violation of the
ministerial ordinance from October 1917 to August 1918 (see Ota (1938, pp.266–269)).
However, the government did not clearly state the criteria of conflict with the ministerial
ordinance, and rice traders could not expect how the government would regulate them.
As a result, the rice traders in the exchanges feared the punishment by the government,
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and refrained from the dealing. In fact, during period spanning June through November,
the total trading volume in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange decreased from 55 million
koku in 1916 to 50 million koku in 1917 (see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1916a, p.21)
and Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1917a, p.25)).3 The Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange
mentioned this situation, “After the government punished the rice buyers in the Osaka-
Dojima Rice Exchange according to the Ministerial Ordinance on Anti Excessive Profit,
the traders were thrown into some confusion. Consequently, the buyers refrained from the
dealing, and the rice futures price fell down.”4 That is, when the rice price increased, the
buyers in the exchange could not trade freely since they were scared of the punishment
according to the ministerial ordinance. This situation caused the exchange not to collect
sufficient information on rice demand, and the market efficiency reduced.
Second factor was the suspension of the futures trading in the exchange. In 1918, the
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce condemned the rice futures as the gambling to
raise the rice price. Then, the government forbade the rice futures trading in Osaka in
April and from July to August.
(Figure 4 around here)
Figure 4 shows that the days of the suspending transactions in the Osaka-Dojima Rice
Exchange from 1914 to 1939. According to Figure 4, the futures trading in the exchange
was suspended for many days in 1918. This suspension of the trading caused the situation
that rice traders could not exchange information on supply and demand of rice sufficiently.
Third, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce inspected the Osaka-Dojima Rice
Exchange and checked all the traders’ account books in June 1918. This inspection also
suppressed the rice futures trading since the buyers were scared of the punishment by the
government (see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1918a, p.11)).
These three factors interrupted the exchange to collect the information on supply and
demand of rice and reduced the efficiency of the futures market (see Figure 2). However,
the rice price decreased in the early 1919 (see Figure 1), and the government eased the
regulation of the rice futures trading. In fact, the government did not punish traders for
violation of the ministerial ordinance from September 1918, and the days of the suspending
transactions decreased drastically in 1919 (see Figure 4). As a result, the market efficiency
improved temporarily in the middle 1919.
5.2.2 Rice Futures under the Original Rice Law
From the late 1920 to the early 1922, the time-varying market efficiency reduced. In
September 1920, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce felt the necessity to adjust
rice supply and demand fundamentally, and began to design the Rice Law in secret (Ya-
sushi Hasumi Memorial Association (1967, p.73)). In the next month, Yomiuri Shimbun
(Yomiuri Newspaper) reported that the government planned to establish the Rice Law.5
In response to this situation, the traders suspected that the government attempted to
prevent the rice price from declining at the same period when the supply volume of rice
3Koku is a unit of rice trading volume in Japan. One koku is equal to 180.39 liters.
4See Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1918b) for detail.
5See Yomiuri Shimbun (1920) for detail.
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increased and the rice price declined (see Figures 1 and 3). In fact, the semi-annual report
of the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange mentioned, “Although the rice supply excessed, the
rice price increased as the government has prepared the Rice Law. The traders suspected
that the government intervened in the rice spot market (see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange
(1921a, p.7)).” The traders’ expectation about the government intervention interrupted
the process of price formation; the information on the supply and demand of rice did not
directly reflected in the futures price. As a result, the market efficiency reduced from the
late 1920.
In April 1921, the Rice Law was established. The establishment of the Rice Law did not
improve the market efficiency immediately. According to Figure 2, the futures transaction
was conducted in the inefficient market until 1925. This situation resulted from the fact
that traders guarded against the government intervention under the Rice Law. Kai Irie,
the bureaucrat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, stated that the traders
paid close attention to the government’s trading in the rice spot market (The Rice Law
Memorial Association (1961, p.71)). In April 1921, Yomiuri Shimbun mentioned, “The
traders expect that the government will buy the rice in early summer, and the futures
price of rice increases.”6 That is, the traders attempted to expect when the government
intervened in the rice market. Nevertheless, they could not expect accurately when the
government would buy or sell the rice in the spot market. The Rice Law allowed the
government to buy and sell in the rice spot market to adjust the balance of rice supply
and demand. However, it did not clearly state the criteria of government intervention.
In fact, Yasushi Hasumi, a head of Agricultural Policy Division, Agricultural Bureau,
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry from 1927 to 1929, mentioned in 1933.
“The government had often traded in the rice spot market of adjust the rice
demand-and-supply balance. However there were no criteria of the interven-
tion. Consequently, it was difficult for us to declare that when we began to
trade rice in response to price fluctuation of rice.”7
Accordingly, anyone could not forecast the government interventions. Under this sit-
uation, whenever the government intervened in the rice market, the efficiency reduced.
(Figure 5 around here)
Figure 5 shows that the volume of the government’s buying and selling of rice in the
spot market from 1914 to 1939. According to this figure, the government intervened in
the rice market frequently after the establishment of the Rice Law. Under the original
Rice Law from 1920 to 1925, the government bought the rice in bulk in June 1921 and
the beginning of 1923 when the rice price declined. On the other hand, it continuously
sold the rice from the middle of 1923 to the middle of 1925 when the rice price increased
(see Figure 1). As a result, according to Figure 2, the efficiency reduced at the same
period and improved in 1922 when the government did not buy and sell the rice in bulk.
However, the futures transaction was still conducted in the inefficient market. As we men-
tioned in Section 2, the government intervened in the spot market to control the balance
6See Yomiuri Shimbun (1921) for detail.
7See Ota (1938) for detail.
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between supply and demand of rice under the original Rice Law; it could not intervene
in the market to control the rice price. Accordingly, the government always intervened in
the market only after estimating the supply and demand of rice (see Omameuda (1993,
pp.198–201)). Under the circumstances, the government could not buy and sell the rice
flexibly in response to the change in the supply and demand of rice, and rice traders could
not forecast the intervention. Consequently, if the government did not intervene in the
market, the transaction was conducted in the inefficient market under the original Rice
Law because the market could not form the price reflecting the future interventions.
5.2.3 Rice Futures under the amended Rice Law
As we mentioned in Section 2, the government amended the Rice Law in March 1925.
After the amendment of the law, the government intervened in the spot market to control
the rice price. This change made it easier for rice traders to forecast the intervention since
the government could buy and sell the rice flexibly in response to the price fluctuation
of rice. In short, when the rice price varied greatly, the traders could expect how the
government would intervene. In other words, when the price was stabilized under the
amended Rice Law, the traders did not need to pay attention to the intervention, and
the futures market could collect information on the supply and demand of rice. In fact,
from 1926 to the following year when the rice price exhibited relatively less volatility
than the early and the late 1920s, the government did not frequently buy and sell the
rice (see Figures 1 and 5). During the same period, according to Figure 2, the market
efficiency improved. In contrast to the situation under the original Rice Law, the futures
transaction was conducted in the efficient market when the government did not intervene
in the rice market under the amended Rice Law. However, the efficiency began to reduce
in the late 1927.
From 1927, the supply volume of rice deviated from its five years moving average
volume, and the futures price fluctuated wildly. In 1927, the volume of rice supply was
the largest after the introduction of the Rice Law (see Figures 1 and 3). Accordingly, the
government bought a large amount of rice to prevent rice prices from falling in the late
1927, and the efficiency began to reduce. However, this intervention failed to prevent rice
prices from declining since the volume of rice imported from Korea increased in 1927 (see
Figures 1, 2, and 5).
The Japanese government issued Beikoku Shoken (Rice Bill) to raise a fund for pur-
chase of rice under the Rice Law, and it amounted to 56,683,460 yen of the Rice Bill in
1927. In the same year, the annual average price of physical rice was 35.23 yen per koku
(see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Agricultural Bureau (1932, p.88)). Accordingly,
the government could buy 1,608,954 koku of rice, and the volume of the government’s buy-
ing reached a ceiling in 1927 (see Figure 5). This ceiling on the buying was 2.6% of the
rice production in the year. If the volume of rice production decreased by 2.6%, percent-
age change of the production volume from the average year would be 1.1% in 1927 (see
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Food Control Bureau (1944, pp.52–53)). This
supposition suggests that the government was able to avoid falling rice price in 1927.
However, the rice farmers in Korea also experienced abundant crops, and the rice import
from Korea increased rapidly in the same year. In fact, its volume amounted to 7,068,709
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koku while the corresponding past five years average of Korean rice imports was 4,709,055
koku from 1922 to 1926 (see Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Food Control Bureau
(1944, pp.52–53)). As the rice import from Korea increased by 50.1%, the domestic rice
supply also increased in 1927 (see Figure 3). Under this situation, the government failed
to avoid falling rice price; the rice price in Japan declined rapidly in 1927. Accordingly,
the Japanese government considered to constrain the rice imports and exports in Korea,
and the rice traders attempted to expect when the government enforced the Rice Law
partially in Korea. This expectation had a potential impact on price formation of rice in
Osaka.
In the 1920s, a large portion of rice cropped in Korea was exported to the home
islands of Japan; rice consumers in Korea basically bought foreign rice since the Korean
rice was more expensive than the rice imported from foreign countries. On the other
hand, rice supply in Osaka depended heavily on the Korean rice imports. In 1927, the
monthly average volume of Korean rice stocks was 237,120 koku while that of domestic rice
stocks was 123,706 koku in Osaka (see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1927b)). Under this
situation, the Japanese government implemented restrictions on rice trading in Korea to
avoid falling rice price in the home islands of Japan (see Omameuda (1993, pp.234–251)).
Concretely, the government enforced the Rice Law partially in Korea in February 1928,
and the Governor-General of Korea operated the import license system of foreign rice
from March to August in 1928 (see Ota (1938, pp.396–397) and Hasumi (1957, p.88)). In
the same period, rice traders expected that these measures in Korea caused the decrease
in the amount of Korean rice and the increase in rice price in Osaka. In fact, the Osaka-
Dojima Rice Exchange reported in 1928, “From January, most traders in the exchange
expected that the government would enforce the Rice Law in Korea. As a result, the trade
in futures became active, and the rice price increases.”8 This situation made it difficult
for the rice traders to predict the rice supply from Korea. Furthermore, the traders could
not predict the supply of domestic rice in the same year.
In 1928, the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange reported that the futures price of rice
increased since the stored rice in the government’s warehouses suffered from insect damage
(see Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1928b)). In the end of the previous year when the rice
price declined, the government bought the rice as we mentioned above. Consequently, the
government’s inventory quantity of rice increased by 56% from 1927 to 1928. However,
the government could not store the large quantity of rice properly (see Ota (1938, pp.656–
657)). This failure decreased the supply volume of domestic rice.
In short, the rice traders could not predict the supply volume of Korean and domestic
rice because of the government’s action and failure. As a result, although the supply
volume of rice did not deviate from its five years moving average in 1928, the futures
transaction was conducted in the inefficient market (see Figures 2 and 3).
In contrast to the rice supply in 1928, the supply volume of rice deviated from its five
years moving average from 1929 under the amended Rice Law, and the rice price varied
greatly (see Figures 1 and 3). Accordingly, the government frequently intervened in the
rice spot market. In this period, whenever the government bought or sold rice in bulk,
the efficiency reduced (see Figures 2 and 5). For example, Japan recorded bumper crop
8See Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1928a, p.7) for detail.
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of rice in 1930, and it led to a dramatic increase in the supply volume of rice. As a result,
the rice price declined drastically in the same year (see Figures 1 and 3). In response
to these circumstances, the government bought the rice in bulk in the spot market to
avoid falling rice price in the late 1930 (see Figure 5). Furthermore, the rice price had
been suppressed until the late 1931 because of the record harvest in 1930, although Japan
experienced poor harvest of rice in the next year. Accordingly, the government intervened
in the rice spot market again in the late 1931. These interventions reduced the efficiency
as the case in the late 1927. Nevertheless, the rice price did not increase substantially
until 1933 since the supply volume of rice increased from 1931 to 1933 (see Figures 1 and
3). In the same period, according to Figure 5, the government frequently bought the rice
in the spot market when the rice price declined and sold it when the rice price increased.
These frequent interventions also reduced the efficiency from 1932 to the following year
(see Figure 2). Therefore, the government interventions under the amended Rice Law
heavily affected the price formation in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange.
5.2.4 Rice Futures under the Rice Control Law
The Rice Control Law was established in November 1933. This law aimed at con-
trolling the rice price and the seasonal fluctuation of rice distribution (see Ota (1938,
pp.728–729)). The government presented the bill of the Rice Control Law to the Diet
in February 1933. Actually, the government attempted to control the seasonal fluctua-
tion of rice distribution before the presenting the bill. In October 1932, the government
issued the Imperial Ordinance No.297. This ordinance allowed the government to buy,
sell, process, and store the Korean and Taiwanese rice to control distribution volume of
imported rice. In fact, the government bought and sold the Korean rice in bulk after
the issuance of the Imperial Ordinance. Especially, the government intensively intervened
from July to October in 1933 and sold 275,897 koku of Korean rice during the same period
(see Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Food Control Bureau (1944, pp.71–72)). This
intervention caused the decrease in the Korean rice price. The four months average price
of Korean rice decreased by 8.7% from MarchâĂŞJune to JulyâĂŞOctober in 1933 while
that of domestic rice decreased by 3.4% during the same period (see Bank of Japan, Re-
search and Statistics Department (1987, pp.98–99)). That is, the price trend of Korean
rice did not fit with that of domestic rice. Consequently, the price trend of the deliverable
commodity was different from that of the trading commodity in the Osaka-Dojima Rice
Exchange. This difference disrupted the futures transaction, and the efficiency reduced
in 1933.
From the establishment of the Rice Control Law in November 1933, the market con-
tinued to be efficient (see Figure 2). This situation resulted from the fact that the Rice
Control Law clearly stated the criteria of government intervention. The law required the
government to set a price range by deciding maximum and minimum prices of rice in
each year (see Ota (1938, p.731)). If the price in the rice spot market deviated from the
range, the government had to sell or buy rice to control the rice price. As a result, the
government began to adjust the volume of buying and selling seasonally after the estab-
lishment of the Rice Control Law. Figure 6 shows that the monthly average net volumes
of government purchase under the Rice Law and the Rice Control Law.
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(Figure 6 around here)
According to Figure 6, under the Rice Control Law, the government bought the rice in
a harvest season when the rice price declined and sold it in a between-crop season when
the rice price increased. Consequently, the traders could expect when the government
would intervene in the rice spot market. As a result, under the Rice Control Law, the
price formation in futures reflected the information on the government interventions. The
discretionary of the government intervention reduced, and the efficiency in the futures
market improved.
6 Conclusion
Considering policies’ nature in the context of “discretion versus rules,” we argue how
and to what extent the Japanese government intervened in the rice futures market in
Osaka during the interwar period when many countries’ governments strengthened their
interventions in markets. Featuring the Japanese government’s constant concern about
stable distributions of rice from the late 1910s to 1933, we found the two facts. First,
the intervention with discretionary power disrupted the rice market and reduced market
efficiency in Fama’s (1970) sense in the exchange Second, the market efficiency improved
in accordance with reduction in the government’s discretionary power to operate the rice
policy.
In 1917, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce enforced the Ministerial Ordinance
on Anti Excessive Profit to suppress rice prices. However, because the government did not
clearly state the criteria of conflict with the ministerial ordinance, rice traders could not
expect when and how the government would punish them. Thus, the ordinance hampered
rice traders’ free trade when rice price increased. At this period, the government did not
behave according to any rule and had some discretionary power. As a result, the Osaka-
Dojima Rice Exchange failed to collect sufficient information on rice demand to help
traders hedge their price risks of rice. This situation continued in the early 1920s.
In 1921, the Japanese government established the Rice Law to intervene in the rice
spot markets. From the same year, the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce directly
bought and sold rice in the spot market to adjust the balance of rice supply and demand.
The law did not cleary state the criteria of government intervention, and the government
could intervene in the market on a discretionary basis. However, the law did not allow
the government to trade to control the rice price, and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Commerce always intervened only after estimating the supply and demand of rice. Con-
sequently, the government intervention on a discretionary basis was not flexible, and rice
traders could not forecast the intervention. Under the circumstance, the rice market failed
to form the price which factored the information on future government interventions, and
the efficiency of the rice futures market in the Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange often re-
duced. Conversely, the amendment of the Rice Law in 1925 and the establishment of the
Rice Control Law in 1933 restricted the government’s discretionary power to operate the
policy. These changes in rice policy altered the government’s behavior in the rice market,
and the market efficiency gradually improved.
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The amended Rice Law allowed the government to intervene to control the rice price.
Accordingly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry bought and sold the rice flexibly
in response to the price fluctuation of rice. In short, the amendment of the Rice Law
made the timing of the government intervention clearer than that under the original Rice
Law. After the amendment of the Rice Law, rice traders did not need to pay attention
to the intervention when the rice price was stabilized, and the futures market could col-
lect information on the supply and demand of rice. As a result, the futures transaction
was conducted in the efficient market when the government did not intervene in the rice
market. The restriction on the government’s discretionary power significantly improved
the market efficiency. However, the market efficiency reduced when the government in-
tervened in the rice market under the amended the Rice Law since the law did not clearly
state the criteria of government intervention. The traders was hardly able to forecast when
the government began to buy or sell the rice in response to the price fluctuation of rice.
In contrast to this situation, the market continued to be efficient from the establishment
of the Rice Control Law in 1933.
Under the Rice Control Law, the government had to set a price range of rice in each
year. If the price diviated from the range, the law required the government to intervene
in the rice market. Accordingly, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry bought rice
in a harvest season when the rice price declined and sold it in a between-crop season
when its price increased. That is, the Rice Control Raw diminished the government’s
discretionary power to operate the rice policy because rice traders could expect interven-
tions. Consequently, the rice market could form the price reflecting the future government
interventions.
In brief, when the government obtained the discretionary power in the sense of Taylor
(1993) to operate the policy regarding commodity market, the market efficiency often
reduced. Conversely, even if the government implemented a large intervention, the market
efficiency improved when the government chose a systematic rule-like behavior following
the law in the sense of McCallum (1993). The actions to the market performed a vital
role in determining the market efficiency. The strengthening of policy on the market did
not always reduced the market efficiency during interwar period in Japan.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Unit Root Tests
Mean SD Max Min ADF-GLS Lags φ N
Rsn,t 0.0001 0.0119 0.1072 −0.1425 −13.8452 14 0.2166 7411
Rd,t 0.0001 0.0116 0.1048 −0.0907 −12.0752 15 0.2266 7411
Notes:
(1) “ADF-GLS” denotes the ADF-GLS test statistics, “Lags” denotes the lag order se-
lected by the MBIC, and “φˆ” denotes the coefficients vector in the GLS detrended
series (see equation (6) in Ng and Perron (2001)).
(2) In computing the ADF-GLS test, a model with a time trend and a constant is
assumed. The critical value at the 1% significance level for the ADF-GLS test is
“−3.42”.
(3) “N ” denotes the number of observations.
(4) R version 3.4.3 was used to compute the statistics.
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Table 2: Time-Invariant VAR Estimations
Rsnt R
d
t
Constant 0.0001 0.0001[0.0002] [0.0001]
Rsnt−1
0.0072 0.1343
[0.0581] [0.0495]
Rdt−1
0.1740 0.0188
[0.0526] [0.0537]
R¯2 0.0307 0.0235
LC 342.4114
Notes:
(1) “R¯2” denotes the adjusted R2, and “LC” denotes Hansen’s
(1992) joint L statistic with variance.
(2) Newey andWest’s (1987) robust standard errors are in brackets.
(3) R version 3.4.3 was used to compute the estimates and the test
statistics.
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Figure 1: Futures Prices of Second Nearest and Differed Contract Transactions
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Note: The shaded areas are inefficient markets in our sample period.
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Figure 2: The Time-Varying Degree of Market Efficiency
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Notes:
(1) The dashed red lines represent the 95% confidence bands of the time-varying spectral
norm in the case of an efficient market.
(2) We ran bootstrap sampling 5000 times to calculate the confidence bands.
(3) R version 3.4.3 was used to compute the estimates.
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Figure 3: Rice Supply in Japan (1914-1939)
Time
Vo
lu
m
e 
pe
r C
ap
ita
 (U
nit
: K
o
ku
)
1915 1920 1925 1930 1935
1.
10
1.
15
1.
20
1.
25
1.
30
1.
35
1.
40
1.
10
1.
15
1.
20
1.
25
1.
30
1.
35
1.
40 Original Series
5−Years MA Series
Data Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Food Control Bureau (1944, pp.52–53).
28
Figure 4: Days of Suspending Transactions (1914-1939)
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Data Sources: Osaka-Dojima Rice Exchange (1914, 1915, 1916b, 1917b, 1918b, 1919, 1920,
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Figure 5: Volume of Purchase and Sales of Rice by the Government in the Spot Market
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Data Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Food Control Bureau (1944, pp.275–
318).
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Figure 6: Monthly Net Volume of Rice by the Government
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Data Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, Food Control Bureau (1944, pp.281–
318).
Note: Monthly net volume of rice is calculated by deducting the monthly average
volume of sales from that of purchase.
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